
Evaluativity as epistemic non-convergence

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Subjective attitude verbs (SAVs), like English *consider* (Lasersohn 2009, Kennedy & Willer 2016, Coppock to appear), embed only evaluative complements, unlike neutral attitude verbs (*think*).

- (1) a. Alfonse **thinks** that {Bethany is six feet tall / the soup is tasty}.
b. John **considers** {?Bethany six feet tall / the soup tasty}.

I cast evaluative propositions as ‘epistemically non-convergent:’ their truth values are undecided according to the epistemic norms of a set of individuals C on any reachable body of evidence E .

(2) **Epistemic convergence of a proposition**

A proposition ϕ is epistemically convergent in w with respect to C iff there is a body of evidence E such that:

in all w' in which C exists that preserve the epistemic norms active for C in w , and in which for all $x \in C$, x is presented with E :

for all $x \in C$, $Evid_{x,w} \subseteq \phi$ or $Evid_{x,w} \subseteq \neg\phi$.

(3) **Evaluativity of a proposition**

A proposition ϕ is evaluative in w with respect to C iff it is not epistemically convergent in w with respect to C .

SAVs quantify over doxastic alternatives determined by belief in evaluative propositions. Non-evaluative complements with SAVs are anomalous, as evaluative beliefs cannot decide on their truth.

- (4) $\llbracket \textit{consider} \rrbracket^w = \lambda\phi_{st}.\lambda x_e. \textit{Dox-eval}_{x,w} \subseteq \phi$

References: • Coppock, E. (to appear): Outlook-based semantics. *Linguistics and Philosophy*. • Kennedy, C. & M. Willer (2016): Subjective attitude verbs and counterstance contingency. *Proceedings of SALT 26*, 913-933. • Lasersohn, P. (2009): Relative truth, speaker commitment, and control of implicit arguments. *Synthese* 166(2), 359-374.