Subjective assertions and inquisitiveness: a hybrid speech act?

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Sentences containing subjective predicates - e.g., *awesome* in (1) - intuitively feature a perspective-dependent flavor, which is instead missing in sentences describing objective facts (as in (2)).

(1) The movie was awesome.

(2) The movie started at 8.

Scholars have long debated on whether this intuition tracks a genuine lexical distinction between subjective and factual predicates (e.g., Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007, Moltmann 2010, Pearson 2013). Less explored, however, is the issue concerning how the difference between (1) and (2) is reflected at the illocutionary level (Umbach 2016). Combining evidence from two experimental studies and the distribution of response particles, I show that assertions containing subjective predicates display a different discourse behavior from objective assertions. I suggest that subjective assertions should be modeled as a mixed discourse move, which encodes both an informative component (similar to regular assertions) and an inquisitive one (similar to polar questions).

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