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# Donnellan, Nunberg and the distinction between literal and non-literal uses of referring expressions

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In the first part, I will argue against Kripke's thesis that non-literal uses of definite descriptions *require* specific referential de re intentions that accompany the use of definite descriptions. I aim to show that we can distinguish at least three kinds of Donnellan cases: uses of definite descriptions that (a) are accompanied by a false de re belief of the form “S believes of o that it is the F” on the side of the speaker; (b) explicitly exploit a false de re belief of the mentioned form on the side of the hearer; (c) explicitly exploit a shared de re pretense of the form “We pretend of o that it is the F”. In the second part, I will argue that Nunberg-cases concerning demonstratives are not a variety of non-literal referential uses and that we can capture Nunberg-cases as literal uses of demonstrative expressions on the basis of the correct conception of demonstrations.

**References:** Donnellan, K. 1966: Reference and Definite Descriptions, in: *Philosophical Review*, 75, 281-304. • Kripke, S. A. 1979: Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference, in: French, P. A., et al. (eds.) *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, 6-27. • Nunberg, G. 1979: The Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions: Polysemy, in: *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 3, 143-184.